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Chapter 6
The Economic Archaeology of Roman 
Economic Performance
Willem M. Jongman
Abstract Recent years have witnessed a paradigm shift in the study of the Roman 
economy. Methodologically modern economic analysis is now far more acceptable 
than it once was, and archaeology has become the major source of empirical data for 
many questions. On the substantive side there is now a far clearer appreciation of 
the major changes that the Roman economy underwent, with substantial growth 
of population and aggregate production and even some improvements in standard of 
living, but followed by equally dramatic decline. This economic success was not 
limited to the imperial core, but also extended to the provinces.
Keywords Economic analysis · Roman Empire · Demography · Living standards
6.1  Introduction
‘What did the Romans ever do for us’? Few have nailed the fundamental question 
of Roman provincial history and archaeology with greater precision than the Monty 
Python team in their ‘Life of Brian’. To put it more academically, the question of 
Roman economic performance should indeed be the core of research on the Roman 
economy: how well did the Roman economy succeed in providing scarce goods and 
services to its population, and how does that performance compare with earlier and 
later periods of preindustrial economic history, or in other regions of the world, such 
as beyond the frontiers of the Empire, or with a faraway Empire such as China?
For decades, however, this fundamental question has been ignored by ancient 
historians and to a lesser extent by archaeologists. Until the mid-1960s the domi-
nant paradigms in ancient history had been that of the philological tradition that 
isolated the study of Greco-Roman society from the dominant narratives and meth-
odological advances in other periods. Ancient history was a backwater taken less 
and less seriously by more modern historians, or by society at large, and quite 
rightly so.
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This started to change in the 1960s, and that change owed much to the towering 
eminence of the late Sir Moses Finley. Educated in America, and principally as a 
social scientist, he began to ask fundamental questions about the nature of ancient 
society, about antiquity’s place in world history, and about our methodologies 
(Finley 1985). Introduced to his work by my teachers, for me as a young student it 
was a breath of fresh air and at the first opportunity I moved to Cambridge to work 
with him.
Yet, for all its uniquely innovative qualities his work was also a very particular 
take on comparative social history, steeped as he was in a very personal mix of neo- 
Marxist thought, substantivist economic anthropology, and later also Weberian soci-
ology. As a result, Classical Antiquity was reduced to a relatively primitive 
forerunner of the Medieval and Early Modern economy, without integrated markets, 
with only small-scale trade and manufacturing, and with a low standard of living for 
the mass of the population (Jongman 1988). His explanation was a cultural one: the 
Greco-Roman elite disdained involvement in trade and manufacturing, and hence 
these potentially innovative sectors of the economy remained small and underdevel-
oped. The wealth that no one could deny that there was, given the splendour of elite 
residences in, for example, Pompeii, or the impressive public buildings of many 
Roman towns, was ultimately the product of rent extraction by the elite and of pro-
vincial exploitation. So altogether the picture of the Roman economy was a quite 
pessimistic one, unless you were rich. Standard of living of the mass of the popula-
tion was and remained barely above minimum subsistence, there was little or no 
economic growth, and for many provinces inclusion into the Empire meant plunder 
and hardship. In contrast, and in a kind of post-colonial discourse, pre-Roman soci-
ety was often viewed as successful. The resulting picture was necessarily a static 
one, and also implies that Late Antique decline was vastly exaggerated by earlier 
scholars. With Peter Brown, the world of Late Antiquity was one of transformation 
rather than decline (Brown 1971).
Methodologically, in Finley’s view, and in line with his earlier mentor Karl 
Polanyi, the alleged absence of economic growth and innovation and of a market 
economy implied that modern economic analysis was useless as a tool: Antiquity 
was different. The gap between this and what other innovative social science histo-
rians were doing at the time was enormous, and as a result ancient history remained 
intellectually separate from mainstream historiography—it still remained what 
Finley himself once critically called ‘a funny kind of history’.
Recent years have seen a major paradigm shift, however. That shift has happened 
along two lines. The first was theoretical and methodological. The aversion to mod-
ern economic theory had created an unholy alliance between modern substantivist 
social science historians, traditional philologists who abhorred having to learn the 
mathematics of economics, and fashionable neo-Marxist demands for an alternative 
economic theory. I guess my book on the economy and society of Pompeii was the 
first explicit critique of all this, and the first example by a professional ancient his-
torian of how one might apply the logic of the dismal science of economics (Jongman 
1988). I tried to show that using modern economics does not immediately make 
Antiquity into the mirror of the modern world. In fact, I used it to unravel the logic 
W. M. Jongman
97
of Roman economic stagnation and underdeveloped such as I perceived it at the 
time. The book was widely reviewed, but the shift in the theoretical paradigm was 
hardly noticed, even if not criticized either. However, all this did change in more 
recent years. The turning point was the work for the Cambridge economic history 
of the Greco-Roman world, and its publication in 2007 (Scheidel et al. 2007). It 
reflected the two lines of the paradigm shift: the use of economics, even if of the 
neo-institutionalist kind, and the second more substantive of the introduction of 
archaeological data into the debate on a scale not seen before (best examples in 
Greene 1986 and Brun 2012). And indeed, the inclusion of the vastly increased 
corpus of archaeological data has critically changed the content of recent debate, 
from one that was mostly concerned with the paucity of data, to one that needs to 
harness an unheard-of quantity of data in a systematic way.1 Not surprisingly, there-
fore, aggregate statistical analysis has become a highly productive tool, changing 
both ancient historians’ apprehension about statistics, and challenging archaeolo-
gists’ post-processual dislike for generalization, and their insistence on the unique 
and individual. In short, I think we, ancient historians and archaeologists, have 
finally become grown-up numbers of the historical discipline.
6.2  How Can We Understand the Roman Economy?
6.2.1  Estimating Population Numbers and Demographic 
Trends
So how can we understand the Roman economy? What are the most important vari-
ables that an economist wants to know about an economy, how can we know about 
them, and what have we learned about them and what not (yet)? The most important 
variable in human history is that of population numbers. How many people were 
there, and how does that relate to resources and to aggregate output in particular? 
Remember: per capita income, the most common measure of personal prosperity, 
equals total production/consumption divided by the number of people. The long- 
term trend in human population history has been decidedly upwards, and increas-
ingly so. Data are highly speculative, but what all estimates have in common is that 
for a long time the planet was pretty empty. The most commonly quoted estimates 
are from McEvedy and Jones (1978), who estimated that at the beginning of the 
Neolithic world population was only four million. This slowly began to increase in 
the Bronze Age, and from then on at an increasingly rapid rate as well, particularly 
since the Industrial Revolution. Their estimate for world population at the beginning 
of the first millennium is 170 million, and this is a very low estimate. It implies that 
roughly a third of world population lived in the Roman Empire, another third, or a 
bit less, in Han China, and yet another third in the rest of the world. For the Roman 
1 The Oxford Roman Economy Project is the best example of this trend.
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Empire, this is based on the relatively low estimates by Beloch, about a century ago 
(see Scheidel 2007 for an overview). These, however, are increasingly criticized, 
with alternative estimates up to about 90–100 million for the Roman Empire. In the 
end, these estimates are little more than wild guesses, without much in the way of 
hard empirical data. Also, they tend to be quite static, pretending to be valid for long 
periods of time.
Recent archaeological research has begun to address both problems, using field 
survey data. The method is to assign hypothetical population numbers to particular 
site types, and multiply these by the number of sites of that type. For long-term 
population history Andreas Zimmermann and his team have produced an impres-
sively robust population reconstruction from the early Neolithic to the Early Modern 
period for the Rhineland, using unique data from the lignite mining region 
(Zimmermann et al. 2009). Apart from the rapid rise in the modern period, what 
really stands out is the dramatic peak in the Roman period, with populations some 
eight times higher than in the pre-Roman Iron Age, and some 13 times higher than 
in the subsequent Merovingian period. What these Rhineland data lack is sufficient 
chronological resolution (but more precision is easily possible). What they have in 
their favour is the exceptionally long timeframe. And it is precisely this long time-
frame that shows that the Roman period is indeed extraordinary, even in relatively 
remote provincial areas: for northern Gaul (north eastern France, Luxembourg and 
Western Germany) Xavier Deru (2017) has recently demonstrated a similar trend of 
rapidly rising site numbers followed by a steep Late Antique decline for a multitude 
of regions, this time with much greater chronological resolution and smartly using 
index numbers rather than absolute numbers for the site numbers to make them 
comparable. The weakness is of course that these are site numbers and not people.
To move from site numbers to numbers of people, Lisa Fentress (2009) has pio-
neered assigning putative numbers of inhabitants to the different site categories, and 
then multiply these for the number of sites in that category. Since then, archaeolo-
gists from the University of Groningen team have applied the same methodology for 
the Nettuno data of their survey in the Pontine region (De Haas et al. 2011; Fig. 6.1).
The absolute numbers are of course guesses that depend on many unknowns, but 
it is important to note that the trends in relative change over time are far more 
secure. And the trend that we see is pretty clear: a dramatic rise in population, par-
ticularly from the late fourth and early third century BCE onwards. This growth 
probably reached its peak in the late second century CE, to then move in pretty 
dramatic reverse: decline and fall were steep. The second thing that can be seen in 
this graph is that population trends in these two regions roughly moved in sync, and 
resemble the trends in site numbers for northern Gaul. A few years ago, Alessandro 
Launaro already observed the same for many of the Italian surveys, even if not using 
these more sophisticated methods (Launaro 2011). I am quite sure that many, though 
probably not all parts of the Empire, will show similar trends of considerable popu-
lation growth, followed by equally dramatic decline, even if that decline may well 
be later in, for example, the Roman East.
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Conceptually this is a wake-up call to abandon the tradition to avoid generaliza-
tion, only looking for local differences in what I like to call the ‘my-valley-is- 
different-syndrome’. Of course, regional differences matter, but primarily in relation 
to a general trend. If we do not identify that larger trend, we cannot even identify 
what is locally specific.
Therefore, three survey teams working around Rome, the British School at 
Rome’s Tiber Valley Project, the Suburbium Project at La Sapienza, and the 
Groningen Pontine Region Project, have joined forces and have recently succeeded 
to integrate their datasets, mostly down to the level of individual sherds. Doing so 
was a big job, and many said it was impossible, but we are pleased that we have 
succeeded, and have solved many thorny issues of pottery and site classification, 
and chronology. The ambition of the consortium is to use our concepts and methods 
to extend this integrated dataset first to some other parts of Italy where conditions 
are likely to be quite similar to what we experienced thus far, and then to other parts 
of the Empire, where as yet unpredictable conditions will probably pose new chal-
lenges for which our methods may or may not provide solutions. The analytical 
ambition is of course to have good empirical data to reconstruct the big story of 
Roman population trends, rural social relations and material culture, if possible for 
the empire as a whole, but also regionally, to differentiate the local from the global.
This population boom and the subsequent decline that we see in so many surveys 
are perhaps the most important things one can say about the Roman economy, but 
their identification is really quite a recent thing. I think it represents the complete 
refutation of the old static paradigm of a preindustrial Roman economy without any 
change. And it is reflected in many other data, of course, such as pollen diagrams 
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Albegna Nettuno
Fig. 6.1 Population estimates for Albenga and Nettuno. (Sources: Fentress 2009 and De Haas 
et al. 2011)
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6.2.2  The Economic Effects of Population Increase
The next question is, of course, what such a population boom meant for the econ-
omy. As I said earlier, per capita income is the result of dividing aggregate produc-
tion and consumption by the number of people. If aggregate production and 
consumption went up to the same degree as population, per capita income would 
obviously remain the same. But that is not necessarily the case. In the modern world, 
population growth is usually outstripped by the growth of production, and as a result 
in Western society per capita incomes have typically grown by about 2% per annum, 
roughly doubling standard of living every generation.
For many preindustrial economies, however, the story was often a more depress-
ing one: population pressure resulted in a declining standard of living for the mass 
of the population.
The graph in Fig. 6.2 by Bob Allen gives what he calls the welfare ratio, i.e. the 
extent to which incomes of ordinary families exceeded bare subsistence (Allen et al. 
2005; Allen 2009). There are a few important things to note. The first is that after the 
Black Death of the fourteenth century people were quite prosperous, but this 
declined under the population growth of subsequent centuries. The second observa-
tion is that the Netherlands and later also England were an exception to this grim 
scenario, and were already far more prosperous than other countries. And a final 
observation is that at least in Late Antiquity, by the time of Diocletian’s price edict, 
life does not seem to have been very cheerful (Allen 2009).
Fig. 6.2 Preindustrial welfare ratios. (Reprinted with permission from Allen (2009, 342))
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Theoretically, it is not surprising that population growth depressed the standard of 
living. A preindustrial economy is essentially a system with two factors of production: 
land and labour. Of the two, land is in more or less inelastic supply, so population 
growth changes the land/labour ratio. Technically, this means a move along the pro-
duction function. If nothing else happens, the economy will suffer from decreasing 
marginal labour productivity. In normal words: if you double the labour force on a 
given plot of land you will increase output, but you will not double it. Such lower 
marginal labour productivity inevitably implies lower labour incomes. So if nothing 
else happens, population pressure depresses the standard of living. The only escape is 
technological change of one kind or another, meaning that the movement along the 
production function is compensated by a shift of the production function. And that 
increased efficiency is why we have become so much more prosperous, and continue 
to do so. Such increased efficiency can originate in technology in the narrow sense of 
the word, such as using watermills, but also in the wider sense of using different crops, 
more division of labour and trade, better management or better institutions. The list is 
a long one. So, once we have established that the Roman Empire experienced a popu-
lation boom, the first challenge is to reconstruct incomes and standard of living for the 
mass of the population. Did they deteriorate under population pressure, or not? What 
is the true answer to the Monty Python team’s question?
Unfortunately, the normal wage data to answer this question are few and far 
between. For the Roman Republican period we have the extensive set of slave prices 
from the Delphi manumission inscriptions (Jongman 2007a; Hopkins 2018). These 
show that slave prices went up significantly, suggesting that during the last two centu-
ries BC real wages for free labour did as well. Roman slaves were expensive because 
free labour cost quite a bit more than the cost of subsistence. For the subsequent 
Imperial period we have a fair number of wages and prices from Roman Egypt, and 
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Fig. 6.3 Wages (in wheat) in Roman Egypt. (Source: Harper 2016)
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Clearly, the Antonine plague marks a turning point, not only in the amount of 
written documentation but also in wage levels (Jongman 2012). Population pressure 
had eased, and yet this did not improve labour productivity and standard of living, 
on the contrary. Therefore, and unlike Harper, who included one linear regression 
for the entire date range, my version of the graph includes separate regression lines 
for the period before and after the Antonine Plague. The last set of wage data is from 
Diocletian’s price edict of 301 CE. As we have seen from Bob Allen’s analysis, by 
that time, standard of living was barely above subsistence (Allen 2009). To sum-
marize these pretty meagre wage data, the standard of living seems to have moved 
with population rather than against it, and theoretically that is quite unusual for a 
preindustrial society.
However, these data are not very good. Fortunately, archaeology now offers far 
better data on material culture and lifestyle. If you cannot measure income, these 
archaeological datasets measure what is done with that income. A first example is a 
dataset on animal bones from archaeological sites, using bones as a proxy for trends 
in meat consumption (Jongman 2007b, 2014b; Fig. 6.4).
This graph represents animal bones from provincial sites, and as can be seen, not 
only is the number of assemblages enormous, but there is also a very clear trend. 



























Fig. 6.4 Animal bones from Roman provinces as a proxy for meat consumption
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fruits and vegetables to fish salting installations (Bakels and Jacomet 2003; Wilson 
2006; Van der Veen 2016). And the consumption boom was not restricted to food: 
housing quality also improved, with larger and more comfortable dwellings, with 
even some window glass. That trend is also visible in the quantities of wood for 
building from Western Germany (Holstein 1980).
What all these types of consumer expenditure have in common is that they are 
not bare bones subsistence goods: they are not the cheapest calories, but the icing on 
the cake. In economic language, they are high income elasticity goods, i.e. goods 
that are consumed more than what you would expect just from income growth. So 
if incomes grow by, for example, 10%, consumption of these goods increases by 
more than 10%. As such they represent the qualitative change in consumption pat-
terns that comes with greater prosperity.
6.2.3  Why Did Roman Population Growth and Wealth 
Go Together?
So all in all, I want to claim that Roman population growth did not produce a dete-
rioration of standard of living, on the contrary. Similarly, Roman population decline 
in Late Antiquity did not improve standard of living like it would do after the Black 
Death of the fourteenth century (Borsch 2005; Campbell 2016). Therefore, the pes-
simistic Malthusian model did not apply. Instead the period of population growth 
went hand-in-hand with greater labour productivity. This leaves us with the final 
question: how could this be? I think there are three possible answers, and they prob-
ably all apply.
The first is that of market integration and increased division of labour. The 
Roman Empire had created an enormous more or less integrated market, connected 
by cheap water transport, and enjoying more or less uniform and effective institu-
tions, ranging from military security to a stable monetary system, good laws and 
pretty good government. The high urbanization rate was where all these processes 
came together (Hanson 2016).
Secondly, however, none of this would have been possible without growth in 
agricultural productivity. New crops managed attentively catered for a taste for bet-
ter and more expensive food, but also produced much higher returns, as long as 
people were prosperous enough to afford them. The prime examples would be wine 
and olive oil. In the end, farmers can choose from a wide range of crops and a wide 
range of strategies. The prevailing carrying capacity modelling fatally ignores alter-
native and more intensive strategies. For example, in the Italian context, producing 
wine and oil could generate perhaps five times more calories per hectare, and 10–20 
times more revenue, but it was labour-intensive, and presupposed a prosperous mar-
ket for these far more expensive calories (Jongman 2016). They presuppose an 
escape from life at the bare subsistence. And that, of course, also made the system 
unstable. When things went wrong, they would go badly wrong.
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The third possible explanation is that these few happy centuries also experienced 
favourable climatic conditions. Economically, that is of course the same as techno-
logical improvement: the same quantities of land and labour began to produce more. 
All this started to go wrong from the mid second century CE, with a deteriorating 
climate, bad harvests, followed by the first in a series of epidemics, which in turn 
was followed by urban decline, social disintegration, and political and military 
upheaval (Manning 2013; Harper 2017). In the West at least the Empire did not 
really recover, even if in the East it did, at least for a while, until another round of 
bad weather and epidemics and the Justinian Plague in particular put an end to much 
of the eastern Empire as well.
6.3  Conclusions
These tentative and provisional conclusions require a far larger and more detailed 
empirical basis, to validate the broad contours, to extricate regional and temporal 
differences and to provide potential explanations. So what do we need for that, and 
what can we do?
First, to create the right analytical framework, I think historians and archaeolo-
gists of the ancient economy should involve themselves with proper economic 
theory, just like historians of medieval or early modern Europe have done (Jongman 
1988). There is no reason to be on a different planet. And they should do so in a 
comparative framework: where does Antiquity stand in comparison to the modern 
world, and perhaps more usefully, in comparison to other preindustrial societies?
Second, they should follow the example of those same Medieval and Early 
Modern historians and the paradigm shift of exhaustive empirical data collection 
exemplified by French Annales historiography and American New Economic 
History. The choice is not between on the one hand big histories based on general-
izations from secondary literature and on the other hand deeply factual microhisto-
ries. Modern economic historians have shown that it is possible to write big history 
from large aggregate datasets (e.g. Fogel 2004; Broadberry et  al. 2015). For the 
Roman world, the written documentation will never give us those datasets, but 
archaeology can. Over the last few decades archaeology has moved from a subject 
of few and isolated data to one where the biggest concern should be to develop 
methodologies and practices that explore the current abundance of data. The chal-
lenge is to develop methods and concepts to serialize those data (the mise en série 
of the Annales) and harness them as proxies for economic variables. A famous early 
example was Keith Hopkins’ use of Parker’s catalogue of Mediterranean shipwrecks 
as proxies for long distance shipping (Hopkins 2018). Since then, many other exam-
ples have followed (Jongman 2014a, b, 2018).
Third, it is time we (and Medieval and Early Modern historians as well) pay 
more attention to the rapid progress made in scientific archaeology (e.g. McConnell 
et al. 2018). Apart from progress in established fields of archaeological science such 
as archaeobotany and archaeozoology, biological standard of living (human body 
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length) or scientific dating methods, we now have more and more stable isotope 
analyses of skeletal material to the extent that for the first time statistically meaning-
ful datasets are becoming available to reconstruct diet or patterns of migration. 
Dental plaque is revealing past infectious disease, and DNA studies show our 
genetic origins. Climate reconstructions are rapidly becoming more realistic and 
uncontroversial. There is no doubt that here we are at the threshold of completely 
new fields of historical knowledge, bringing us closer than ever to our ancestors and 
their quality of life.
Finally, we need more experimental archaeology to reconstruct the logic of many 
ancient practices. What were the opportunity costs of choosing one process over 
another, in terms of labour productivity, total output or risk? If and when agriculture 
is the dominant productive activity, this is something that has to be done within 
constraints and mechanisms from nature, and hence it should be relatively easy to 
model. What strategic alternatives did our ancestors have, and how successful were 
their choices? In short, I am convinced we are witnessing the end of traditional his-
tories of the Roman economy, both substantially and methodologically.
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